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CASE NOTES
Constitutional Law-Equal Protection Clause-Public Required to Pay
Publication Costs for Poor Litigant in Divorce Action.--Plaintiff petitioned
the court for a divorce from her husband pursuant to the newly enacted divorce
law which permits an aggrieved party to maintain an action on the grounds of
abandonment "by the defendant for a period of two or more years."' An obvious
indigent, she sought and obtained an order permitting her to sue as a poor
person.2 Service of a summons being necessary to commence the action,3 plain-
tiff was allowed, after a diligent but fruitless attempt to locate her husband, to
serve by publication, the cost of which was about three hundred dollars. With
the city's consent, plaintiff obtained an order directing the payment of the ex-
pense by the city. Because of the magnitude of the expense, however, the city
asked that the order be withdrawn. At the rehearing, the court held that denial
of payment for such auxiliary expenses as publication, when they are required
by law, would be an invidious discrimination against poor persons in violation
of the equal protection clause of the federal 4 and state5 constitutions, and
ordered payment of the expense. Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 296
N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
"Equal justice for the poor actually is one of the gravest social and legal prob-
lems of our times . . . . " There have been at least three distinct approaches
toward its resolution: the common law, in forma pauperis statutes, and the equal
protection clauses found in many state constitutions as well as in the Federal
Constitution.
There has been some disagreement as to whether there exists any common
law right to sue in forma pauperis, i.e., without payment of the various costs of
litigation imposed by procedural statutes or court rules.8 The courts finding
such a right rely on British common law9 and on such basic principles of Anglo-
1. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 170(2) (Supp. 1968).
2. See note 17 infra.
3. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 304, 315-16; cf. id. 3031.
4. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 11.
6. Jacoby, Legal Aid to the Poor, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 940, 976 (1940).
7. For a discussion of other approaches to this problem, see Jacoby, supra note 6; Ma-
guire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 361 (1923); Comment, The Right to
Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 1322 (1966); Comment, Litigation Costs:
The Hidden Barrier to the Indigent, 56 Ga. L. Rev. 516 (1968).
8. See Maguire, supra note 7; 56 Ga. L. Rev., supra note 7, at 520-21; 6 Calif. L. Rev.
226 (1918).
9. Brunt v. Wardle, 133 Eng. Rep. 1254 (C.P. 1841); see Majors v. Superior CL, 181
Cal. 270, 184 P. 18 (1919); Martin v. Superior CL, 176 Cal. 289, 168 P. 135 (1917); Mc-
Clenahan v. Thomas, 6 N.C. 175 (1813); Lewis v. Smith, 21 RI. 324, 43 A. 542 (1899);
Spalding v. Bainbridge, 12 RI. 244 (1879) (per curiam); Hickey v. Rhine, 16 Tex. 576
(1856).
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American jurisprudence as that stated in the Magna Carta: "[W]e will not
deny or defer to any man either Justice or Right."'1 Opposition to the existence
of such a right at common law has been led by the Supreme Court, which has
held that the right to sue in forma pauperis exists only where granted by stat-
ute." The weight of authority against the existence of this right at common law
and the varied interpretations given the right where it is recognized,12 make it,
at best, a nebulous right of small practicality to an indigent who is unable to
afford the expense of winning his action, much less to participate in extensive
motion pleading to establish this right.' 3
Statutory relief for a poor litigant is not a new development. The forerunner
to modern in forma pauperis statutes was passed in 1494, and provided that, at
the Chancellor's discretion, poor persons could be granted writs without payment
for seals or writing and could be assigned counsel to prosecute their suits with-
out reward.' 4 Some thirty-two states, the District of Columbia and the federal
government have adopted in forma pauperis statutes or court rules. 1 While
these provisions vary considerably, the New York statute,'" a somewhat typical
example,' 7 has not significantly advanced the position of the poor person over
the position conferred on him by the 1494 enactment. In New York if a litigant
qualifies as a poor person,' s the court may assign him a free attorney, and pro-
vide him with a stenographic transcript paid for by the county or city in which
the action is tried; he is liable for court costs and fees only if he recovers. The
cost of publication in the present case was originally held to be a fee within
the meaning of the statute and relief was granted on that basis.19 Upon rehear-
ing, however, the court decided that auxiliary expenses such as "publication
costs, witness fees, printing expenses, expert witnesses and general investigation
costs °20 were not within the purview of the statute. Since the present New York
10. 1 Hen. 3, c. 29, § 2(b) (1225) ; see Hickey v. Rhine, 16 Tex. 576 (1856). Such propo-
sitions have long been recognized in admiralty cases. Berhaus v. The Georgeanna, 31 F. 405
(S.D-N.Y. 1877).
11. Bradford v. Southern Ry., 195 U.S. 243, 251 (1904). See also Ownebey v. Morgan,
256 U.S. 94 (1921); Bristol v. United States, 129 F. 87 (7th Cir. 1904); Roy v. Louisville
N.O. & T. Ry., 34 F. 276 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1888); Hoey v. McCarthy, 124 Ind. 464, 24
N.E. 1038 (1890); Campbell v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 23 Wis. 490 (1868).
12. See cases cited note 9 supra.
13. See note 17 infra.
14. 11 Hen. 7, c. 12 (1494).
15. 56 Ga. L. Rev., supra note 7, at 523 (1968).
16. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1102.
17. E.g., the federal in forma pauperis statute provides for essentially the same relief,
except that specific provision is made for process serving. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1964).
18. To qualify as a poor person, one must file an affidavit listing the amount and sources
of his income and stating that he cannot afford the costs, fees and other expenses of the
action or appeal. The affidavit must also state the nature of the action and present sufficient
facts to allow the court to ascertain the merit of his contentions. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1101.
19. Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 57 Misc. 2d 416, 292 N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
20. 58 Misc. 2d at 1048, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 79.
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in forma pauperis statute is "'merely a recodification of the former statute and
rules,' ,,21 this determination was based on an examination of the history of
New York in forma pauperis statutes. While noting that no other jurisdiction
has a statutory provision for payment of such auxiliary expenses out of public
funds,22 the court acknowledged that the legislature has not been reluctant to
aid the poor litigant in New York. The problem in the subject case, however,
was novel.23 The right to base an action for divorce on abandonment, thereby
requiring service by publication, did not exist in New York until June 16, 1968.24
Prior to this time auxiliary expenses were not required by procedural statutes
in order to prosecute a divorce action. Auxiliary expenses have been required
in other civil actions but they were either minimal or, as in a personal injury
action, paid by the attorney under a contingent retainer.205 The problem of the
instant case had not, therefore, previously arisen.2 6
Unable to grant relief under the in forma pauiperis statute, the court broad-
ened its investigation to determine whether the denial of relief solely because
of inability to pay was inconsistent with the state or federal equal protection
clauses. 27 "The essence of the right to equal protection of the laws is that all
persons similarly situated be treated alike."28 In Griffin v. Illinois20 the Supreme
Court held that an Illinois statute, which granted the right of appeal in all
criminal cases30 but provided a free transcript only to indigent defendants who
were sentenced to death,3' was discriminatory, because "a State can no more
discriminate on account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or color."32
Even though Griffin was a criminal case it has civil implications.33 Mr. Justice
Douglas, dissenting to denial of certiorari in Williams v. Shaffer,34 argued that
denial of the right to contest an eviction proceeding violated the equal protec-
tion clause. He compared the denial of a hearing to a denial of "the right to
21. Id. at 1047, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 79.
22. Id. at 1049, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
23. Id. at 1050, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
24. N.Y. Doam. Rel. Law § 170 (Supp. 1968).
25. 58 Misc. 2d at 1050, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
26. Id. at 1050, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
27. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment has been "characterized
by Mr. Justice Holmes as 'the last resort of constitutional lawyers' . .. ." Tussman & ten-
Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341 (1949).
28. Myer v. Myer, 271 App. Div. 465, 472, 66 N.YS.2d 83, 90 (1st Dep't 1946), ald
mem., 296 N.Y. 979 (1947). See generally Barbier v. Connolly, 113 US. 27 (1885); Frank
& Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," So Colum. L.
Rev. 131 (1950); Tussrman & tenBroek, supra note 27.
29. 351 US. 12 (1956).
30. Id. at 13.
31. Id. at 14.
32. Id. at 17.
33. Note, Discriminations Against the Poor and the Fourteenth Amendment, 81
Harv. L. Rev. 435, 446 (1967).
34. 385 U.S. 1037 (1967).
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appeal," "the right to file a habeas corpus petition," or, citing Griffin, "the right
to obtain a transcript necessary for appeal. 3 5
Clearly, the equal protection clause does not apply solely to criminal prose-
cutions.80 It has been cited to require equal voting power regardless of income 7
and to find a $1.50 poll tax requirement unconstitutional.8" Likewise, property
ownership as a qualification to holding office has been held violative of the equal
protection clause as an invidious discrimination based on wealth.8 9 Application
of the equal protection clause to civil cases4" was explicitly provided for in
Barbier v. Connolly,41 the court holding that all persons "should have like access
to the courts of the country for the protection of their persons and property,
the prevention and redress of wrongs, and the enforcement of contracts . . . . 42
There can be no doubt, therefore, as to its application to marital cases. 43
The instant court held that it was "manifestly discriminatory under Griffin
standards to deprive Mrs. Jeffreys of that right [of access to the courts in a
divorce action] while affording it to others with money. ' 44
While the decision accords with a series of Minnesota cases,4 5 it is not without
opposition. In Boddie v. State40 a three judge district court found no constitu-
tional mandate to excuse indigents the fees and costs incident to a divorce ac-
tion. That court distinguished cases involving imprisonment and voting rights
from "ordinary civil actions," pointing out that in the latter "the state has no
... direct participation .... -47 In the present case, however, the court rebutted
the premise of the Boddie decision: "[O]ur State Constitution ... mandates that
divorces may be granted only by 'due judicial proceedings.' Furthermore State
statutes dictate .. the grounds for separation or divorce and the obligations of
the parties after the termination of the marriage. For all purposes the State is
very much ... a 'party' in a matrimonial action." 48 The implication of the in-
stant case is a rule requiring the state to pay all expenses required by statute to
35. Id. at 1039-40.
36. Id. at 1039.
37. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963) ; see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1963).
38. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
39. Landes v. Town of N. Hempstead, 20 N.Y.2d 417, 231 N.E.2d 120, 284 N.Y.S.2d 441
(1967).
40. Carrington v. Rash, 380 US. 89 (1965) (voter qualification); Uberman v. Lasner,
55 Misc. 2d 1027, 287 N.Y.S.2d 464 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (right to dwell in a rent controlled
building).
41. 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
42. Id. at 31.
43. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964);
Smith v. Smith, 2 N.Y.2d 120, 138 N.E.2d 790, 157 N.Y.S.2d 546 (1956).
44. 58 Misc. 2d at 1056, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
45. See Munkelwitz v. Hennepin County Welfare Dep't, 280 Minn. 377, 159 N.W.2d 402
(1968).
46. 286 F. Supp. 968 (D. Conn. 1968).
47. Id. at 973.
48. 58 Misc. 2d at 1051, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 82 (citations omitted); see Foster, Marriage: A
"Basic Civil Right of Man," 37 Fordham L. Rev. 51 (1968).
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prosecute or defend a cause of action by a party qualifying as a poor person.
It seems unlikely, however, that this rule would be expanded to include expenses
not required by statute since denial of such expenses would not, under present
holdings,49 be deemed discriminatory.
The instant case may prove to be a costly precedent, but justice has no eyes
for silver.
Estate Tax-Life Insurance Proceeds-Premium Payments by Decedent
Held a Transfer of Pro Rata Share of Proceeds and Includible in Gross
Estate.-Eight years prior to his death the decedent and his wife purchased two
$10,000 insurance policies on his life, one for each of his daughters, who were
named as owners and initial beneficiaries. The annual premium payments on the
two policies were paid with community funds of the decedent and his wife. The
executors having offered no proof of decedent's state of mind, the court found
that decedent's payment of premiums on the two policies within three years of
his death was "in contemplation of death."1 By reason of his participation in
the payment of premiums on the policies, the court concluded that a percentage
of their proceeds were includible in his gross estate. The proper percentage, the
court found, was controlled by Revenue Ruling 67-4632 which computes the per-
centage as the amount of the decedent's payment of premiums within three years
of his death divided by the overall payment of premiums on the policies. Because
the court was in a community property state and the premiums were paid out
of community funds, it was presumed that decedent contributed one-half of each
premium payment. Hence, the amount of the proceeds included in decedent's
gross estate was three-eights of one-half of the total proceeds of $20,000. First
National Bank v. United States, 2 CCH Fed. Est. & Gift Tax Rep. I 12,574
(W.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 1968).
The decision in the instant case is startling only because of its application of
Revenue Ruling 67-463 without so much as an indication of the controversy
which surrounds the ruling or the fact that its conclusion was directly contrary
to that recently reached by a Michigan district court in Gorman v. United
States.3 The Michigan court held that where the insured deceased paid the
premiums on a nine-month-old life insurance policy at all times owned by his
wife only the dollar value of the premiums were deemed transferred "in contem-
plation of death" and none of the proceeds were includible. The court rejected
Revenue Ruling 67-463 because it ignored the legislative history and intent
relating to the elimination of the premium payment test from the 1954 Code.4
Under section 2042 of the present federal estate tax law, proceeds of life
49. See Waldon v. District Ct., 256 Iowa 1311, 130 N.W.2d 728 (1964).
1. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2035, and text accompanying notes 14-18 infra.
2. Rev. Rul. 463, 1967-2 Cum. Bull. 327.
3. 288 F. Supp. 225 (E.D. Mlich. 1968).
4. Id. at 226.
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insurance are expressly made includible in decedent's gross estate, if (1) the
proceeds are payable to the executor, or (2) the decedent died possessed of any
incidents of ownership although the proceeds are receivable by other beneficiaries.
Incidents of ownership include not only title but also the powers, among others,
to change beneficiaries, to assign or cancel the policy and to receive its cash
surrender value.5 The possibility that the estate will obtain a reversionary inter-
est in the proceeds may also be deemed an incident of ownership. 6 The 1939
Code had also included insurance proceeds in decedent's gross estate where the
decedent, directly or indirectly, paid the premiums on the policy.7 This became
known as the premium payment test because not all the proceeds were included
in the gross estate but only "in proportion that the amount so paid by the
decedent bears to the total premiums paid for the insurance .... .,, The premium
payment test was eliminated by the adoption of the 1954 Code because it was
thought that the test was discriminatory in its treatment of life insurance as com-
pared to other property transferred by the decedent. 9 Three years later, an
attempt was made to reinstate a limited premium payment test in the Tech-
nical Amendments Act of 195710 because of fear of widespread avoidance of
estate tax by assigning ownership of policies before death." The amendment
did not gain approval by the House. It appears therefore that Congress has
declared its intention that payment of premiums is no longer a factor in deter-
mining taxability under this section of the Code.12
5. For other examples of powers included within the term "incidents of ownership" see
Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (2-3) (1964).
6. Id.
7. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811(g)(2)(A), 53 Stat. 122.
8. Id.
9. S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1954) describes the changes effected by the
1954 Code as follows: "No other property is subject to estate tax where the decedent initially
purchased it and then long before his death gave away all rights to the property and to
discriminate against life insurance in this regard is not justified.
"The House and your committee's bill retains the present rule including life-insurance
proceeds in the decedent's estate if the policy is owned by him or payable to his executor,
but the premium test has been removed. To place life-insurance policies in an analogous
position to other property, however, it is necessary to make the 5-percent reversionary inter-
est rule, applicable to other property, also applicable to life insurance."
10. See H.R. 8381, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 56 (1957).
11. The possible grounds for tax avoidance was explained to the House in H.R. Rep. No.
775, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1957) as follows: "Your committee believes that there are
possible abuses under the existing provision where a decedent transfers a policy shortly
before his death or where a policy is purchased on his life shortly before his death, because
in such instances it is possible to plan the avoidance of the Federal estate tax. Moreover,
where death occurs shortly after the transfer, the value of the amount transferred is greatly
increased."
12. The result, therefore, after the adoption of the 1954 Code was the propensity of
estate planners to advise their clients to transfer their life insurance policy and retain no
incidents of ownership, thereby avoiding the inclusion of the proceeds into the gross estate.
Brown & Sherman, Payment of Premiums as Transfers in Contemplation of Death, 101
Trusts & Estates 790 (1962).
[Vol. 3 7
1969] CASE NOTES
The question remains whether insurance proceeds can be included in the gross
estate under other sections of the 1954 Code such as section 2035 concerning
transactions in contemplation of death. A number of commentators have warned
that section 2042 is not exclusive13 and that a transfer of a life insurance policy
can easily be deemed a gift in contemplation of death because of the inherent
testamentary nature of such life insurance.' 4 Section 2035 provides that, as a
general rule, "[t]he value of the gross estate shall include the value of all prop-
erty.., to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any
time made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, in contempla-
tion of his death."15 Because of the huge administrative problems presented by
such a general rule,' 6 the section sets up a rebuttable presumption that any
transfer of property, for less than fair consideration, within three years of de-
cedent's death shall be deemed made in contemplation of death. 17 Any transfer
before such a three year period is conclusively presumed not in contemplation of
death.'8
Where the decedent has made an actual gift of an insurance policy on his life
and dies within three years of the gift, the face amount of the policy is included
in his gross estate in the absence of evidence to rebut the presumption. 0 A more
difficult problem is presented where the insured survives the three-year period
after the transfer and continues the payment of premiums, or, where the insured
13. See, e.g., 1. A. Casner, Estate Planning 328 (3d ed. 1961); 2 J. Mertens, Federal Gift
and Estate Taxation 348-49 (1959).
14. Schwartz, Life Insurance Estate Planning, 35 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 10-11 (1961).
15. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2035(a).
16. C. Lowndes & R. Kramer, Federal and Estate Gift Taxes 64 (1956).
17. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2035(b). This statutory presumption can be rebutted by
proof that the transfer was not in contemplation of death but, rather, sprung from a life
motive. A transferor's intention to financially assist his family or friends has been held to
constitute a life motive, see, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 242 (E.D. Ky. 1961).
Also the intention to provide financial independence and a sense of security to the transferors
children has likewise been held to be a living motive. See Hull v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d
367 (3d Cir. 1963); Parish's Estate v. Commissioner, 187 F2d 390 (7th Cir. 1951). Living
motives were attached to a transfer where decedent intended to put the policies beyond the
reach of possible judgment creditors in Estate of Verne C. Hunt, 14 T.C. 1182 (1950).
Transfers of insurance policies made to avoid estate taxes are generally deemed to be in
contemplation of death. See, e.g., Vanderlip v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 329 U.S. 728 (1946). However, if a transfer of property is made to reduce income tax,
it may be sufficiently life motivated so as to be excluded from decedents gross estate. See
Commissioner v. Sharp, 91 F2d 804 (3d Cir. 1937).
As the instant case pointed out the estate must rebut not only the statutory presumption
that a transfer within three years of death is in contemplation of death but also the pre-
sumption of correctness of the Commissioner's position. 2 CCH Fed. Est. & Gift Tax Rep. at
8875; see Goodson, Are Life Insurance Proceeds Gifts in Contemplation of Death?, 103
Trusts & Estates 25 (1964).
18. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2035(b).
19. Stoeer, Tax and Non-Tax Factors in Ownership and Transfer of Life Insurance, 21
Tax Law. 205, 214 (1967).
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never owned the policies but made the premium payments.20 Should there be
included only the dollar value of the last three years' premiums, or the insurance
proceeds attributable to those premiums, or all the insurance proceeds? 21 Rev-
enue Ruling 67-463 was aimed at these questions and takes the second position,
viz., "[T] he value of that proportion of the amount receivable as insurance that
the premiums paid within three years of death bear to the total premiums paid
is includible in the decedent-insured's gross estate under the provisions of section
2035 of the Code."22 In other words, a premium payment test will be applied.
The Gorman court, after reviewing the history of the premium payment test
under section 2042, refused to apply Revenue Ruling 67-463 because it saw the
Service attempting to do administratively what the legislature had consciously
refused to do.23 While many commentators agree with Gorman and feel that
Revenue Ruling 67-463 is a revival of the old premium payment test against
legislative intent,24 there is no unanimity. For some, the elimination of the test
from section 2042 is no bar to its application in section 2035.26 Still others sim-
ply accepted the idea of a pro rata test where the deceased paid the premiums.20
The critics of Revenue Ruling 67-463 mount their attack not only on grounds
that the rule is against congressional intent but also because they deem it un-
supported in case law, contrary to the literal language of section 2035 and indif-
ferent to actuarial realities. In order for the payment of premiums to carry a
proportionate amount into the decedent's estate under 2035, the Service must
prove that a "transfer" of the proceeds has taken place. The Service contends
that a "premium payment is a gift of insurance protection, a transfer of an
interest in the policy which is transmuted at death into the proceeds of the
policy. ' 27 The Revenue Ruling cites Chase National Bank v. United States28 for
20. The latter situation was that presented to the courts in both the instant case and
Gorman v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 225 (E.D. Mich. 1968).
21. B. Harnett, Taxation of Life Insurance (1957).
22. Rev. Rul. 463, 1967-2 Cum. Bull. at 329.
23. 288 F. Supp. at 230.
24. Brown & Sherman, supra note 12; see Simmons, IRS Rules Premium Payments
Within Three Years of Death Puts Proceeds into Estate, 28 J. Taxation 146 (1968);
Stoeber, supra note 19.
25. See Hill, Living With R/R 67-463, 107 Trusts & Estates 621, 622 (1968), where It
was said, "The classic premium payment test then, has not been revived by the new ruling
since it is relying on Section 2035 for its theory of inclusion." (Emphasis omitted.)
26. Some writers who considered the question of the inclusion of life insurance proceeds
under section 2035 before the issuance of Rev. Rul. 67-463 concluded that the premium pay-
ment test would continue to be applied. See B. Harnett, supra note 21, at 93; Mannhelmer,
Wheeler & Friedman, Gifts of Life Insurance by the Insured, N.Y.U. 13th Inst. on Fed.
Tax. 247, 260; Schwartz, supra note 14, at 11.
27. Rev. Rul. 463, 1967-2 Cum. Bull. 328. This theory receives some support from
United States v. Manufacturer's Nat'l Bank, 363 U.S. 194 (1960), the case which upheld
the constitutionality of the old premium payment test. It was said there that "[tjhat
disposition, which began with the payment of premiums by the insured, is completed by his
death. His death creates a genuine enlargement of the beneficiaries' rights. It is the 'generat-
ing source' of the full value of the proceeds." Id. at 198 (citation omitted).
28. 278 U.S. 327 (1929).
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the theory that the valuation of a transfer can take place at the time of death.-
But Chase involved the constitutionality of taxation of life insurance proceeds,
the estate contending that it was a direct tax on property and void because not
apportioned. The relationship of premium payments to policy proceeds was not
considered by the court.30 Also, the decedent retained incidents of ownership
after the transfer?' In the hypothetical problem 32 assumed by the Revenue
Ruling, the decedent paid premiums on a policy that he completely transferred to
his wife more than three years earlier. If he has made a complete gift, and
divested himself of ownership sufficiently to avoid includibility under section
2042, how can he be deemed to "transfer" in contemplation of death a property
interest in something he no longer owns? 33 It would appear that the most he
can be deemed to have transferred is the actual dollar amount of the premiums
he paid after the gift and within three years of death.3 4
A more serious "transfer" problem occurs where the policy was originally
issued to a third person but the insured pays the premiums, as in the instant case
and Gorman. It would appear obvious that the Service could not prove a "trans-
fer" of the policy in such a situation and in fact such has been offered in the
past as advice. 35 Unfortunately, Revenue Ruling 67-463 was intended to cover
this situation as well as one where the decedent pays premiums after making a
gift of the policy?6 One critic notes that no reason is given in Revenue Ruling
67-463 for including proceeds in decedent's estate when the insured decedent
was never the owner.37 It appears that the "Service proceeds on the theory that
29. "It would not, we assume, be seriously argued that its [the former in contemplation
of death section] provisions could be evaded by the purchase by a decedent from a third
person of property, a savings bank book for example, and its delivery by the seller directly
to the intended beneficiary on the purchaser's death, or that the measure of the tax would
be the cost and not the value or proceeds at the time of death." Id. at 337. Contra, McGehee
v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 1958).
30. See Simmons, supra note 24, at 148.
31. See Comment, In Contemplation of Death Life Insurance Premiums: Arguments
Against Revenue Ruling 67-463, 3 U. San Francisco L. Rev. 116 (1968).
32. Internal Revenue Rulings are guidelines handed down by the Service based upon
questions and hypothetical situations. They are not binding on the court or the Commissioner.
33. Brown & Sherman, supra note 12, at 793, 843.
34. Post-gift premium payments were held to be nothing more than simple gifts of
money with no effect on the proceeds in Lamade v. Brownell, 245 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Pa.
1965); accord, Hull v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1963); Goodnow v. United
States, 302 F.2d 516 (Ct. Cl. 1962). It should also be noted that the Service's position in
Rev. Rul. 67-463 is inconsistent with its position for federal gift tax purposes. There the
Service holds that payment of premiums by the insured on a policy to which he holds no
incidents of ownership (presumably because of an earlier transfer or the fact that he was
never the owner) constitutes a transfer or a gift "to the extent of the premium paid." See
Treas. Reg. § 20.2511-1(h)(8) (1964).
35. Stoeber, supra note 19, at 215.
36. The second question covered by Rev. Rul. 67-463 reads "The Internal Revenue
Service has also been asked to consider a similar situation wherein the original application
for insurance on the life of the decedent was made by the wife." Rev. Rul. 67-463, 1967-2
Cum. Bull. 327.
37. Simmons, supra note 24, at 148.
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when the insured does everything necessary for the issuance of a policy on his
life . . . and [provides] the funds for payment of at least the first premium,
the insured has . . . in substance, if not also in form, transferred the policy on
his life to his wife or to his children, as the case may be."38
The Service looks to Liebman v. Hassett89 to sustain the argument that a
premium payment works a pro rata transfer of the proceeds. In Liebman a policy
for $50,000 was issued to decedent in 1916. In 1935 he transferred it to his
wife in consideration of love and affection. Thereafter, the wife paid the two
premiums which fell due prior to decedent's death. The wife, as executrix, argued
that only the cash surrender value of the policy at the time of assignment should
have been included in the gross estate. The court held, agreeing with the Com-
missioner, that the full $50,000, less the portion which the wife's two premium
payments bore to total cost of the policy was included in his gross estate. While
the decision could be read to support the Service's position that the proper time
to evaluate the effect of premium payments is at the death of decedent, it cannot
be read as a ground for the pro rata test because the decision rested on section
302 (g) of the 1926 Code which made proceeds taxable to the extent "taken out"
by decedent. Thereunder, proceeds were includible to the extent the premiums
were paid for by decedent. The proportion of the proceeds attributable to the
two premiums paid for by the wife thus had to be excluded. 40
Most critics readily admit that there is some relation between premium pay-
ments and proceeds received at death. In support of the pro rata test, the Ser-
vice appears to contend that the two are intimately related because if the insured
donor failed to pay the premiums his gift of the policy would fail.4 ' This continu-
ing gift theory, however, should not be pushed to its logical extreme, because, if
it were, it would appear that the decedent's last premium payment supported
the whole policy and provided for all the proceeds. Therefore, the full face
amount would be includible in the gross estate.42 This was not the law even
under the old premium payment test.43
It has also been pointed out that although there is a relation between premiums
and proceeds of life insurance, the assumption that it is a pro rata one disregards
actuarial realities.44 The ordinary premium on a policy is composed of three
actuarial elements: cost allocation in case of a cash surrender; cost of death risk,
and cost of doing business risk.45 Only the portion of the premium payment
38. Id. at 149. Such an opinion by the Service is opposite to that of the decision in Estate
of Miran Karagheusian, 23 T.C. 806, 814 (1955), rev'd on other grounds, 233 F.2d 197 (2d
Cir. 1956) where it was said the "[d]ecedent, never having owned the policy, could not and
did not make any transfer of it in contemplation of death or othervise."
39. 148 F.2d 247 (1st Cir. 1945).
40. See Brown & Sherman, supra note 12, at 791; Simmons, Contemplation of Death
and the New Premium Payment Test, 53 AB.XA.J. 475 (1967).
41. Brown & Sherman, supra note 12, at 843.
42. This would be the case especially where the policy was term or straight life Insurance.
See Simmons, supra note 40, at 476.
43. See Goodnow v. United States, 302 F.2d 516. (Ct. Cl. 1962).




allocated to the cost of death risk is logically to be included in decedent's estate,
assuming a premium payment test.46 The problem is compounded where the
policy calls for an extended term insurance or has an automatic premium loan
provision which may carry the policy for three years or more after a default in
premium payments.47
A number of ways to avoid the inclusion of proceeds in the estate under the
new premium payment test have been suggested. The most obvious means
would be the attachment of living motives to premium payments enough to sat-
isfy the court that they were not made in contemplation of death and remove
it from section 2035.48 Because of the testamentary character of premium pay-
ments on life insurance, the rebuttal of the presumption of contemplation of
death for premium payments made within three years may be an "insuperable
burden.149 Where such evidence is not available to the estate, another device-
one more intriguing than time-tested-would be an initial pre-payment of three
annual premiums. In such a situation, none of the proceeds should be included
in the gross estate if the decedent lives for three or more years after the pre-
payment because the proceeds were paid for with premiums paid more than three
years in advance of deathP0°
Cash gifts by the insured to the new policy owner, used by the latter to pay
the premiums is not a positive way to avoid the new premium payment test.
Such devices, for instance, where the wife-owner paid premiums with her checks
but husband-insured funded wife's checking account, have been held under the
old premium payments test of the 1939 Code to be an indirect payment by the
insured.51 Under Revenue Ruling 67-463, indirect payments by the insured
would still presumably carry a part of the proceeds into decedent's estate.52 The
irrevocable transfer of income-producing assets to the donee without restriction,
the income of which may be used to pay premiums, have avoided the premium
payment test in the past.53 Yet, the establishment of an irrevocable, inter vivos
trust with directions to the trustees to pay the insurance premiums out of the
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. For examples of living motives which have been accepted by courts in the past see
note 17 supra.
49. Goodson, supra note 17, at 25.
50. See Simmons, supra note 24, at 148.
51. See Estate of Clarence H. Loeb, 29 T.C. 22 (1957); Estate of Charles B. Wolf, 29
T.C. 441 (1957). Contra, Estate of Julius Selling, 24 T.C. 191 (1955) (cash gifts to wife to
pay premiums were held not in contemplation of death).
52. This would probably be the Service's approach not only because the old premium
payment test covered indirect transfers but also because Revenue Ruling 67-463 cites
Lehman v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 99 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 637 (1940) involving
an indirect transfer of consideration to support the new premium payment test.
53. In Ford v. Kavanaugh, 108 F. Supp. 463 (E.D. Mich. 1952), the son of decedent
cashed the policy transferred to him and purchased two new policies on his father's life.
Held: new policies were not includible in father's gross estate. Contra, Estate of E.A.
Showers, 14 T.C. 902 (1950).
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principal of the trust may run the risk of the inclusion of proceeds under the
theory of indirect payments.54
The instant case and Gorman represent the chaos caused by Revenue Ruling
67-463. Because the ruling has only shallow support from congressional intent
and case law, the ruling should not be followed blindly. Indeed, an examination
of some of the problems involved in a premium payment test, suggests that the
court was not justified in following it.
Securities Regulation-Punitive Damages Awarded Under Section 17(a)
of the Securities Act of 1933.-Law Research Service, Inc. commenced opera-
tions in 1964, engaging in the business of legal research by computer, and entered
into an exclusive five-year contract with the Univac Division of the Sperry Rand
Corporation for programming, computer time and related services. On January
29, 1965, however, Sperry Rand terminated the contract for nonpayment of a
balance due in excess of $82,000, and refused to provide the services any longer.
Law Research then instituted an action against Sperry Rand for breach of the
contract. Subsequent to the termination of the contract and the commencement
of the action,1 an Offering Circular2 for 100,000 shares of common stock of Law
Research, containing prominent references to the "Sperry Rand contract," was
distributed to the public, but without any mention of the termination of that
contract or of the resulting lawsuit. When the dispute was later revealed to the
public, the shares fell in price. Plaintiffs, thirteen purchasers of the shares,
charged Law Research, its president, Hoppenfeld, and the underwriter, Blair &
Co., Granbery, Marache, Inc., with violation of section 17(a) of the Securities
Act of 19338 (hereinafter the 1933 Act), of section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 19344 (hereinafter the 1934 Act), and with common law fraud.
Blair & Co. was also charged with violation of sections 12(2) of the 1933 Act,5
and 15(c) of the 1934 Act.0 The jury found for plaintiffs on all counts except
the common law fraud count, and, in addition to compensatory damages, awarded
punitive damages against Blair & Co. and Hoppenfeld under 17(a). The court
54. Carlton's Estate v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1962) rev'g 34 T.C. 988
(1960) (insurance trust); Bennett v. United States, 185 F. Supp. 577 at 586-87 (N.D. Ill.
1960) (dicta); Estate of Edmund W. Mudge, 27 T.C. 188 (1956); Estate of Frank A.
Vanderlip, 3 T.C. 358 (1944).
1. Sperry Rand terminated the contract effective January 29, 1965, and the lawsuit was
commenced by Law Research on February 23, 1965, while the Offering Circular was made
public on March 15, 1965.
2. This offering was exempted from the requirement of a Registration Statement because
of its small size (100,000 shares), under Regulation A, promulgated by the Securities Ex-
change Commission under § 3(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(b) (1964).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1964).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1964).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (1964).
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sustained this award, and also refused to enforce the indemnification clause in
the underwriting agreement in favor of Blair & Co. Globus v. Law Research
Service, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal docketed, No. 32766-68
(2d Cir., Oct. 4, 1968).
"The purpose of the federal securities acts is to insure that the public investor
... will obtain the benefit of a thorough investigation of the facts set forth in
a prospectus or offering circular ... so that prospective investors will have ac-
cess to the truth."7 To achieve this end, both false or misleading statements
and omissions of fact are prohibited.8 The offering circular in the instant case
clearly violated the latter prohibition, and defendants were quite properly held
liable for the resulting damage to purchasers. The reference in the circular to
the Sperry Rand contract was highly misleading, when not accompanied by some
mention of the dispute that had arisen thereunder, since such a contract would
be a highly attractive feature of the issuing corporation due to Sperry Rand's
well known position in the computer field.
However, the court went beyond previous securities law decisions in permitting
the award of punitive damages. Punitive damages are prohibited under the 1934
Act,9 but no such limitation appears in the 1933 Act, and, since the court found
that there was adequate evidence from which an inference of wanton, willful
and fraudulent misconduct involving some degree of moral turpitude could be
drawn, the issue of punitive damages was permitted to go to the jury. In then
sustaining the jury's award, the court reasoned that since civil liability itself was
implied under section 17(a), 1°0 punitive damages could also be awarded there-
under."- Furthermore, since the jury had found the requisite misconduct on the
part of defendants, and since the awarding of punitive damages would serve to
deter fraud in the sale of securities generally, the court stated that the award
would be both proper and beneficial, and would accord with the purposes of
the securities acts.1
Blair & Co. alleged that for punitive damages to be awarded, all elements of
common law fraud need be shown.'3 The court rejected this argument, stating:
"[P]rovided plaintiff can establish wanton dishonesty, high moral culpability
and a gross fraud aimed at the public generally ... punitive damages can be
awarded for violation of § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, even in a case in which plain-
tiff has not brought himself within the technical elements of common law
deceit." 4 The court specifically held that an actual intent to defraud need not
7. 287 F. Supp. at 199.
8. See, e.g., statutes cited notes 3-6 supra.
9. 15 US.C. § 78bb(a) (1964).
10. 287 F. Supp. at 194. See authorities cited therein.
11. The sole authority cited by the court is A. Bromberg, Securities Law: Fraud-SEC
Rule 10b-5 § 9.1 n.20 (1968); see 287 F. Supp. at 197.
12. 287 F. Supp. at 194-95.
13. See id. at 195. The elements of common law fraud are: (1) false or misleading state-
ments or omissions of fact; (2) in respect to material facts; (3) with an actual intent to
defraud; (4) justifiable reliance by plaintiff; (5) with damage resulting therefrom.
14. Id. at 196.
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be proven for punitive damages under 17(a), 1r, but only that defendants had
actual knowledge that the material facts in question were misleading or false,10
since the more rigorous standard is not even required in criminal cases under the
securities acts.17 In addition, the court stated that plaintiff need not show
justifiable reliance on defendants' misconduct, since the standard under the
securities acts is actual reliance, i.e., plaintiff would have been influenced to act
differently had there been disclosure by defendant.18
Therefore, in order-to recover punitive damages in a private civil action under
section 17 (a), plaintiff need prove that defendants made false or misleading state-
ments of material facts with actual knowledge of their falsity or misleadingness,
with resulting damage or loss due to actual reliance thereon, as part of a scheme
or course of conduct engaged in by defendants with wanton dishonesty, high
moral culpability and a generally fraudulent purpose against the public as a
whole. Clearly this standard announced by the court will require some clarifica-
tion for application to cases involving facts between mere negligent misstate-
ments19 and the extreme presented in the instant case, if the new weapon of
punitive damages is to be an effective adjunct to federal securities regulation.
The court refused to enforce the indemnification clause in the underwriting
contract between defendants on grounds of public policy.2 0 Reasoning that the
public policy embodied in federal securities legislation would be contravened by
permitting a party guilty of the misconduct shown here to be indemnified for
its liability, the court refused to lessen the motivation of an underwriter to prop-
erly perform, "at least under circumstances where [the underwriter] has been
found guilty of misconduct evincing actual knowledge or reckless disregard of
the falsity of the offering circular .... ,,21 Such a holding, the court stated, would
give greater incentive to underwriters to properly investigate and be as certain
as is reasonably possible that the prospectus bearing their name is truthful,
thereby properly performing their duty under the federal securities acts.
In overturning the jury's verdict in favor of Blair & Co. on the cross-claim,
the court rejected the claim of Blair & Co. that it was entitled to indemnification
because it was less guilty than Law Research, finding that Blair & Co. had suf-
ficient knowledge of the facts to be precluded from indemnification because it
was a co-wrongdoer. While the court cited no authority for its holding here, the
reasoning of the court may be based on the case of Kaiser-Frazer Corp.
v. Otis & Co.22 There the court refused to grant plaintiff damages for breach
of a contract whereby defendant was to sell common stock of plaintiff, because
the prospectus (incorporated into the contract) contained material misstate-
15. Id. at 198.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 196.
19. Such statements are the only statements dearly excluded from punitive damages
liability by the instant case. See 287 F. Supp. at 197-98.
20. Id. at 199.
21. Id.
22. 195 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1952).
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ments of fact. The court reasoned: "[I] t is clear that a contract which violates
the laws of the United States and contravenes the public policy as expressed in
those laws is unenforceable."23 The court also stated that such a contract is void
"regardless of the equities as between the parties" 24 since public policy compre-
hends the interests of others and overrides the interests of the parties.2 Addi-
tional support for the court's holding in the instant case may be found in section
14 of the 1933 Act,2 6 which renders void and unenforceable any contract or
clause in derogation of the Act, and in section 11(f) of the 1933 Act,27 which
prohibits contribution between persons guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation.
While the court's refusal to enforce the indemnification agreement in the in-
stant case may be a just result, the opinion of the court gives no standard and
little authority under which the result was attained. The opinion as a whole
seems to indicate that the standard for refusing indemnification is the same as
that for an award of punitive damages, but the decision does not expressly so
state, merely stating that to permit indemnification would be contrary to public
policy.2s
Much clearer guidelines must be promulgated if the beneficial result sought
by the instant decision is to be attained. Particular care should be given to
separating the standards for awarding punitive damages and those for refusing
indemnification-or, it should be made clear that these standards are identical
if such is the case, as the instant case seems to indicate, but does not so state.
Torts-Reasonable Man Test Determines Landowner's Liability.-Plain-
tiff, while a social guest in defendant's apartment, informed her that he intended
to use the bathroom. Defendant knew that a porcelain faucet handle on the
bathroom sink had cracked, creating a dangerous condition, but did not warn
plaintiff of the defect. As plaintiff twisted the handle, it broke, causing severe
injuries to his hand. The Supreme Court of California denied defendant's
motion for summary judgment and held that an occupier of land' should be
governed by a reasonable man test in determining his liability towards all types
of intruders upon his property, regardless of their status as trespasser, licensee
23. Id. at 843.
24. Id. at 844.
25. See Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 US. 173 (1942); E.E. Taenzer & Co.
v. Chicago, RI. & Pa. Ry., 191 F. 543 (6th Cir. 1911).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1964), cited by the Kaiser-Frazer court as additional support for
its holding. 195 F.2d at 843 n.8.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1964).
28. Cf. Kroll, Some Reflections on Indemnification Provisions and S.E.C. Liability In-
surance in the Light of Barchris and Globus, 24 Bus. Law. 681, 690-92 (1969).
1. The tenant rather than the owner was sued because historically liability arising out
of conditions or activities on the land have been focused on possession. The reasoning behind
this is the belief that the man in possession is usually in the best position to make sure
other persons are not injured. W. Prosser, Torts § 57, at 358 (3d ed. 1964).
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or invitee. Rowland v. Christian, - Cal. 2d -, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97
(1968).
Traditionally, a landowner's liability for tortious injury to a person who
comes upon his land has been predicated on the status of the plaintiff as
licensee,2 invitee8 or trespasser.4 A "social guest," as was plaintiff in the instant
case, is a type of licensee. The duty traditionally owed to such a plaintiff is
similar to that owed a trespasser: the defendant in possession need only refrain
from intentional, willful or wanton acts of injury.5
This rigid, common law classification system has led to some unfortunate
results.6 Consequently, most jurisdictions developed exceptions to the tradi-
tional doctrine for cases involving, e.g., a "dangerous instrumentality" or active
2. A licensee has a privilege to enter or remain upon the land of another by virtue of
the possessor's consent, whether given by invitation or permission. Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 330 (1965); W. Prosser, supra note 1, § 60, at 385.
3. "An invitee is either a public invitee or a business visitor." The former is one on
land by invitation as a member of the public "for a purpose for which the land is held open
to the public," while the latter "is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land for
a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor of the
land." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 332 (1965).
4. A trespasser is a person who enters the land of another without being privileged to do
so. Id. § 329.
5. W. Prosser, supra note 1, at § 60. The original concept behind this minimal standard
of care was the sovereignty of the landowner, which allowed him to do what he wished
on or with his own property. F. Bohlen, Studies in the Law of Torts 163 (1926). The
occupier's duty is greater when an invitee or "business visitor" comes upon the land. Here
the defendant is required to inspect the premises and render them reasonably safe for
the visit. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Nichols, 173 Tenn. 602, 118 S.W.2d 213 (1938); American
Nat'l Bank v. Wolfe, 22 Tenn. App. 642, 125 S.W.2d 193 (1938). A higher standard of
care is "the price which the man in possession must pay for the economic benefit, present
or prospective, to be derived from the visitor's presence .... " Prosser, Business Visitors
and Invitees, 26 Minn. L. Rev. 573, 574 (1942).
6. E.g., in Reardon v. Thompson, 149 Mass. 267, 21 N.E. 369 (1889), plaintiff, a
licensee, fell into a hole on defendant's land which had been dug by the defendant. The
court held that a person goes onto the land of another at his own risk and must accept the
premises as he finds them. The Reardon court felt that a hole not concealed is a danger
which the plaintiff must accept. There was some discussion as to whether or not plaintiff
might have been a trespasser, but the court said that in either case the result would be the
same. The court stated: "No doubt a bare licensee has some rights, The land-owner
cannot shoot him." Id. at 268, 21 N.E. at 370; accord, Ford v. United States, 200 F.2d
272 (10th Cir. 1952). Plaintiff sued for injuries suffered by his son when a booby-trap on
government land exploded. The federal court applied Oklahoma law which said that an
owner of real property is not liable for injuries to adults or infants and owes no duty of
active care unless he knew of the dangerous condition and the injured person was unaware
of such dangerous condition. The court refused to apply the "dangerous instrumentality"
doctrine. See note 7 infra.
7. A dangerous instrumentality is anything which, when brought upon the property of
another, increases the likelihood that any person entering upon said property is in danger
of being injured by such instrument. See generally 12 Rutgers L. Rev. 599 (1958). One who
brings a dangerous instrumentality upon his property is liable for negligence and lack
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negligence.8 Indeed, courts have often placed rather forced constructions upon
these exceptions in order to permit recovery by a plaintiff who would otherwise
have been barred because of his common law status.9
The present court's ruling placed the common law classifications in proper
perspective as one circumstance to consider in determining whether a duty of
care has been breached. 10 This rationale had been approximated by the United
States Supreme Court a decade earlier: "Through this semantic morass the
common law has moved, unevenly and with hesitation, towards 'imposing on
owners and occupiers a single duty of reasonable care in all the circum-
stances.' -11 The majority in the instant case, realizing that its result could have
been reached by applying California precedents, 12 went on to state: "[W]e
of skill in its use even if plaintiff is a trespasser or licensee. Van Winkle v. American
Steam-Boiler Co., 52 N.J.L. 240, 19 A. 472 (Sup. Ct. 1890).
8. Active negligence imposes liability regardless of plaintiff's status when there is negli-
gent conduct by means of active operations. Bylling v. Edwards, 193 Cal. App. 2d 736, 14
Cal. Rptr. 760 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961); see, e.g., De Haven v. Hennessey Bros. & Evans
Co., 137 F. 472 (6th Cir. 1905) (operating machinery); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v.
Blevins, 293 S.W.2d 246 (Ky. 1956) (running a train); Lordi v. Spiotta, 133 N.J.L. S81,
45 A.2d 491 (Sup. Ct. 1946) (shutting off gas); Brigman v. Fiske-Carter Constr. Co., 192
N.C. 791, 136 S.E. 125 (1926) (backing up a truck); Potts v. Amis, 62 Wash. 2d 777, 384
P.2d 825 (1963) (swinging a golf dub). Other exceptions to the common law system include
the "trap doctrine" and the concept of "attractive nuisance." See Patterson v. Proctor
Paint & Varnish Co., 21 N.Y.2d 447, 235 N.E.2d 765, 288 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1969); James,
Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Licensees and Invitees, 63 Yale L.J.
605 (1954).
9. Rowland v. Christian, - Cal. 2d at -, 443 P.2d at 565, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
E.g., Hansen v. Richey, 237 Cal. App. 2d 475, 46 Cal. Rptr. 909 (Dist. CL App. 196S). In
Hansen, a youth drowned in a pool during a party and the court held the owner liable, not
for maintaining a dangerous pool, but for negligence in actively conducting a party for
young people around a dangerous pool. In Barbarisi v. Caruso, 47 N.J. Super. 125, 135
A.2d 539 (App. Div. 1957), the court held that a washing machine could be considered a
dangerous instrumentality.
10. - Cal. 2d at -, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104. The court applied Cal. Civ.
Code § 1714 (1954): "Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts,
but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the
management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want
of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself." Significantly section 1714 states a civil
law rather than a common law principle. See C. Civ. art. 1386 (65e ed. Petits Codes
Dalloz 1966). See also Fernandez v. Consolidated Fisheries, Inc., 98 Cal. App. 2d 91, 219
P2d 73 (Dist. Ct. App. 1950).
11. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatantique, 358 US. 625, 631 (1959) (foot-
notes omitted).
12. - Cal. 2d at -, 443 P2d at 569, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 105; eg., in Demmon v. Smith,
58 Cal. App. 2d 425, 136 P.2d 660 (Dist. Ct. App. 1943), plaintiff was an employee in the
same market where defendant leased his meat counter. Plaintiff came behind defendant's
counter to serve coffee as was his custom, and was injured when defendant's employee pivoted
around with a knife in his hand. Defendant contended that plaintiff was a licensee and,
therefore, the only duty owed him was to refrain from wantonly or wilfully injuring him.
The court held this rule applies only to passive as opposed to active negligence. But when
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are satisfied that continued adherence to the common law distinctions can only
lead to injustice or, if we are to avoid injustice, further fictions with the result-
ing complexity and confusion."'1 3 While the present court was not the first court
to present this criticism, it was the first to set down a viable alternative rule.
14
Our society is no longer rooted to the land, a fixation which tended to justify
the common law classification doctrine. Coming upon the land of another with
or without permission does not make a person's life or limb less valuable.
Furthermore, reasonable people do not act differently depending upon the status
of another.15 Rather than presaging different results in future cases, the court
here has brought the theory behind landowners' liability into harmony with
legal realities. 16
active negligence is involved, and here the pivoting around the knife was deemed to amount
to active negligence, the court said that the defendant has the duty to exercise ordinary
care to avoid injuring anyone upon his premises. In the instant case, the court could have
found that the defendant, being aware of the cracked faucet, was actively negligent In
authorizing the plaintiff to use her bathroom. Perhaps the court could have stretched the
"trap doctrine" and said that the cracked faucet was inherently dangerous and deceptively
safe looking. The court could also have considered holding that allowing the cracked faucet
to remain unrepaired in her bathroom amounted to the maintenance of a "dangerous In-
strumentality" by the defendant.
13. - Cal. 2d at -, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
14. In Potts v. Amis, 62 Wash. 2d 777, 384 P.2d 825 (1963), a Washington court came
close to throwing out the classifications but by their language restricted the decision to its
peculiar facts. The court found active negligence but indicated "a willingness to accept the
rule of reasonable conduct under the circumstances." Id. at 785, 384 P.2d at 830. The
Potts court cited Sherman v. Seattle, 57 Wash. 2d 233, 356 P.2d 316 (1960), wherein the
court stated: "In view of the peculiar facts of this case, we feel that the standard of care
owed respondent by appellant cannot be made to depend upon respondent's technical status
on appellant's premises at the time of the accident." Id. at 239, 356 P.2d at 320. These two
earlier cases are narrower than the instant case and are, by their own language, restricted
to their particular facts. See also Comment, Land Occupant's Liability to Invitees, Licensees,
and Trespassers, 31 Tenn. L. Rev. 485, 495 (1964).
15. - Cal. 2d at -, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
16. England has abandoned the classification system by legislation. Occupier's Liability
Act of 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31.
